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MIDDLE VOICES VOL. I
The Masochian woman is a figure who stages what is at 
stake for women when desire and the law come together. 
This requires an examination of the conflict that exists between 
the idea that women’s masochism is the fantasy of men and 
the truth about who wields power in the masochistic theatre. 
Thus, the inquiry into women’s masochism means following 
Jacques Lacan’s conception of women’s masochism in Anxiety, 
which describes it as holding a “completely different meaning, 
a fairly ironic meaning, and a completely different scope” from 
the pervert’s masochism or moral masochism (Lacan, 2016, 
p.190). Beginning with a critical analysis of Freud and Lacan’s 
theories on masochism, I will decipher what feminine masochism 
is and why we are usually only presented with cases where the 
man exhibits this type of masochistic desire. In order to reach 
a full understanding of this different and ironic meaning for 
women’s masochism, it is important to examine the connec-
tion between the gaze and masochism to comprehend the way 
in which the fantasy of the Other is an essential mechanism in 
the design of the masochistic theatre. However, connecting 
these two perversions as both belonging on the passive side 
of the erotic register, as Lacan does in “The Function and 
Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis”, does not go 
far enough, and it must be understood that masochism itself is 
inherently reliant on the gaze as an essential part of the mas-
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ochistic theatre, and allows it to function as a fantasy. Thus, for 
masochism to exist in women, even if it is ironic, Lacan proposes 
that the fantasy imagined by the Other, or the male fantasy,  
is what is enacted. This leads to the question of what role 
anxiety plays in the male fantasy. Lacan believes the masoch-
ist’s aim is the anxiety of the Other. If woman is enacting a male 
fantasy, and one which causes anxiety in the face of the Other’s 
desire, and man sustains his jouissance through his own anxi-
ety, what is this anxiety? I believe Deleuze provides the answer 
to this question in his own discussion of the three women 
figures in Masoch’s work. It is the figure of the Grecian wom-
an, who “believes in the independence of women and in the 
fleeting nature of love; for her the sexes are equal” (Deleuze, 
1967, p.47), that is the cause of anxiety for man. For Aphrodite, 
equality between men and women is the “crucial moment 
at which she gains dominance over man, for ‘man trembles as 
soon as woman becomes his equal’” (47-48). In Écrits, Lacan 
reminds us of Freud’s advice “not to reduce the supplement of 
the feminine with respect to the masculine tothe complement of 
the passive with respect to the active” (2005, p. 615). In rep-
resenting what Lacan calls the ‘absolute Other’ the Masochian 
woman is able to wield the power of law through her control of 
the masochistic mise en scène.
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n Lacan’s “Guiding Remarks for a 
Convention on Female Sexuality,” 
he posits the question, “Can we rely 
on what masochistic perversion owes 
to male invention and conclude that female 
masochism is a fantasy of male desire?” In 
my discussion of women’s masochism, I trace 
the connections between masochism and the 
gaze in psychoanalysis, which has important 
implications for the fantasy formation and the 
theatricality of women’s masochism. Lacan 
would go on to later state in Seminar X: Anx-
iety that “that women’s masochism is a male 
fantasy” (2016, p.190), seemingly confirming 
this question from his earlier writings. By 
tracing the connections between the gaze as 
objet a and masochism in the work of both 
Freud and Lacan it leads to an understanding 
of process involved in the formation of the 
masochistic fantasy, and its extimate nature. 
Thus, by transferring this understanding of 
masochism to the Masochian Woman reveals 
the irony which Lacan saw in the concept 
of a masochistic woman, but also the power 
relations involved in the theatre of masochism.  
To come to a theoretical awareness of the 
Masochian Woman, it is also necessary to 
understand who she is not, and therefore 
this paper will also examine several figures of 
women who display characteristics of masoch-
ism, but do not fully embody the identity of 
the woman I seek.
Masochism and the Gaze
In Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality (1905/1924) he names sadism and 
masochism as “the most common and the 
most significant of all the perversions” (p. 23), 
and, following Krafft-Ebing’s naming of 
these perversions, he emphasizes the way 
that Krafft-Ebing’s nomenclature “[brings] 
into prominence the pleasure in any form of 
humiliation or subjection” (1924, p. 23). In 
his discussion of masochism, Freud gives a 
general description of the perversion as being 
comprised of “any passive attitude towards 
sexual life and the sexual object, the extreme 
instance of which appears to be that in which 
satisfaction is conditional upon suffering 
physical or mental pain at the hands of the 
sexual object. Masochism, in the form of a 
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perversion, seems to be further removed from 
the normal sexual aim than its counterpart 
[sadism]” (1924, p. 24). This explanation 
was added by Freud in 1924, along with the 
footnote stating: “I have been led to distinguish 
a primary or erotogenic masochism, out of 
which two later forms, feminine and moral 
masochism, have developed. Sadism which 
cannot find employment in actual life is 
turned round upon the subject’s own self and 
so produces a secondary masochism, which is 
superadded to the primary kind” (p. 24). The 
classifications of different types of masochism 
are also outlined by Sigmund Freud in “The 
Economic Problem of Masochism” (1924), and 
his discussion is centered around Feminine 
masochism because, for Freud, it is “most 
accessible to our observation and least 
problematical, and it can be surveyed in all 
its relations” (p. 276). According to Freud, 
this Feminine form is based not only in the 
erotogenic form, pleasure in pain, but also 
“places the subject in a characteristically female 
situation” (p. 277). This type of masochism is 
only ever discussed in the male subject, and 
since women already exist in these ‘charac-
teristically female situations,’ Freud never 
seems to consider diagnosing the perversion 
in a female patient. Therefore, to understand 
what it means for a woman to engage in 
masochism we must also consider Lacan’s 
idea of women’s masochism as holding a 
“completely different meaning, a fairly ironic 
meaning, and a completely different scope” 
from either the male pervert’s masochism 
or moral masochism (Lacan, 2016, p. 190). 
However, that does not necessarily mean that 
Freud’s investigation into male masochism 
is unhelpful. It provides us the means for 
understanding how and why women engage 
in masochism.
If we take a step back to Freud’s earlier 
work discussing Krafft-Ebing’s naming of 
sadism and masochism in the Three Essays on 
the Theory of Sexuality, and the emphasis on 
humiliation and subjection which Freud finds 
innate to this perversion, the language used 
in this passage echoes the preceding section 
in the Three Essays regarding ‘Touching and 
Looking’. Here, Freud discusses the pleasure 
in looking (scopophilia) and, like sadism and 
masochism, he proposes that perversions 
of looking occur in two forms: the active 
and the passive. He goes on in the section 
‘Sadism and Masochism’ to align the pain 
of masochism with both disgust and shame 
as forces that “[stand] in opposition and 
resistance to the libido” (Freud, 1924, p. 25). 
Thus, for Freud, the passive act of looking/
being looked at and masochism are aligned 
together on the side of the Nirvana principle, 
which “expresses the trend of the death 
instinct,” although under modification by the 
libido (Freud, 1924, p. 275). The subject who 
does not seek his own good is influenced by 
the death drive, and this is manifest clinically, 
according to Freud, in various ways, such as 
repetition compulsion, or masochism, which 
relies on the gaze to function.
Bringing the discussion of the gaze back 
to Lacan’s 1949 essay “The Mirror Stage as 
Formative of the Function of the I as Re-
vealed in Psychoanalytic Experience” Lacan 
first explores the gaze and the role it plays in 
the formation of the I. Here, he describes the 
mirror stage “as an identification, in the full 
sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, 
the transformation that takes place in the 
subject when he assumes an image” (Lacan, 
2005, p. 76). This stage of identification is un-
derstood to involve a specular image reflected 
for the child to see himself, and this process 
therefore involves an exteriority in order to 
resolve the analysand’s “discordance with his 
own reality” (Lacan, 2005, p. 76). The end 
of the mirror stage, which occurs when the 
I is linked to “socially elaborated situations” 
(Lacan, 2005, p. 79), is also important, as 
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Lacan points out, saying, “It is this moment 
that decisively tips the whole of human 
knowledge (savoir) into being mediated by 
the other’s desire” (Lacan, 2005, p. 79). This 
hints at the further development of the mirror 
stage which focuses around the ‘other’s desire.’ 
Adrian Johnston provides a succinct descrip-
tion of the later, 1960s mirror stage:
language-using (and language-used) 
big(ger) Others bathe the infant in a 
cascade of statements and behaviors 
whose saturating effects endow the 
specular components of the mirroring 
moment, Lacan’s primal scene of 
inaugural identification, with their 
special, fateful status. The petit a(utre) 
of the child’s forming ego, partially 
bound up with imagistic representa-
tion, is originally and primordially a 
precipitate of “the desire of the Other”. 
(Johnston, 2013, p. 256)
Here, Johnston brings together the mirror 
stage together with later Lacan, and, in doing 
so, ties the literal, specular activity of seeing 
oneself in the mirror to the non-specular gaze 
as empty objet a. 
These statements regarding the mirror 
stage focus our attention on the desire of the 
other/Other. The idea that “man’s desire is 
the desire of the Other” (Lacan, 2016, p. 22) 
is reiterated throughout Lacan’s work, and 
will be key, in analysis, to understanding the 
function of masochism for the woman anal-
ysand. When Lacan states that knowledge is 
mediated by the other’s desire, later to become 
the big Other, he is referring to an “intimate 
exteriority” (Lacan, 1999, p. 139), or extimacy, 
which is naturally mimetic. The process of the 
mirror stage is not isolated to the individual, 
but, as Johnston outlines it in his article, is a 
process which depends on the influence of 
big Other(s). Johnston provides the following 
description for this important process:
Insofar as the ego itself, as what 
becomes intimate ‘me-ness,’ is born  
by crystallizing around a core kernel  
of external Other-subjects’ fantasy- 
formations, it could be said to be an 
instance of extimacy in Lacan’s precise 
sense of this neologism. Put differently, 
at the very nucleus of the recognized 
‘me’ resides a misrecognized (à la 
Lacanian méconnaissance) ‘not-me,’ 
something ‘in me more than myself ’. 
(Johnston, 2013, p. 256)
Thus, our own fantasies and desires are never 
truly our own because the formation of what 
makes me who I am is built around a kernel 
of extimacy. So, when Lacan states in Seminar 
X: Anxiety “that women’s masochism is a male 
fantasy,” (2017, p. 190) this is what he means. 
He is referring to the conceptualization of 
a masochistic woman, which becomes the 
kernel for the fantasy of masochism for  
the subject.
Lacan directly links the concept that 
“man’s desire is the desire of the Other” to the 
gaze in “What is a Picture?” when he states: 
“I would say that it is a question of a sort 
of desire on the part of the Other, at the end 
of which is the showing (le donner-à-voir)” 
(1981, p. 115). The particular word showing 
that Lacan uses here indicates to us that the 
gaze is not merely a process of being seen, 
but requires a conscious showing on the part 
of the subject who is being seen, and literally 
translates from the original French le donner-
à-voir as giving-to-see-it. Lacan goes on to 
pose the question, “How could this showing 
satisfy something, if there is not some appetite 
of the eye on the part of the person looking?” 
(1981, p. 115), and he feels that this reveals 
the truth about the eye: that it is a voracious 
and evil eye (1981, p. 115). What is not 
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mentioned here is what this showing reveals 
about the one who is performing the ‘giving-
to-see-it’. This ‘giving-to-see-it’ represents 
an unstated agreement between the one who 
sees and the one who shows, not unlike the 
masochistic contract, which reveals that this 
giving not only satisfies the appetite of the 
eye of the viewer, but also satisfies some desire 
on the part of the one who gives. For Freud, 
this ‘giving-to-see-it’ is another form of the 
perversion of looking because it supplants, or 
overtakes the importance, of the normal sexual 
aim. Freud provides three cases in which 
looking becomes perversion: when looking is 
“restricted exclusively to the genitals,” when it 
is connected to disgust, or when it supplants 
the importance of the normal sexual aim 
(1924, p. 23). However, when this ‘giving-
to-see-it’ is incorporated into the masochistic 
fantasy, and if Freud’s classification of what 
is considered a perversion is strictly followed, 
then the presentation of the masochistic 
individual in a submissive or humiliating 
position as “visual impression” is simply “the 
most frequent pathway along which libidinal 
excitation is aroused” (Freud, 1924, p. 22), and 
as long as the act of looking is only preparato-
ry to the normal sexual aim, this visual arousal 
can be considered a way to raise the libido to 
a “higher artistic aim” (Freud, 1924, p. 23). As 
I will later discuss in regards to masochism, 
the theatrical act of looking and showing 
is usually a step in the script of masochism 
which does not completely take the place of 
touching or the normal sexual aim, but instead 
a passive, masochistic form of looking can be 
considered an “artistic and theatrical display” 
(Bronfen, 1996, p. 60) by Freud.
In “I Hear You With My Eyes” Žižek 
expands further on Lacan’s ‘evil eye’ concept 
and categorizes the voice and the gaze as objet 
a which align with life and death. However, 
simply connecting these two perversions 
as both belonging on the passive side of 
the erotic register does not go far enough. 
Masochism itself is inherently reliant on the 
gaze as an essential part of the masochistic 
theatre which allows it to function as a 
fantasy. The intrinsic nature of the gaze in 
relation to masochism is revealed by going 
back to Freud’s initial discussion of sadism 
and masochism, where he states that rather 
than overemphasizing the element of pain 
associated with these practices it is “the plea-
sure in any form of humiliation or subjection” 
(Freud, 1924, p. 23) that should be our focus. 
By tracing the etymology of ‘subjection’ to 
the Latin subiectiōn, which means the “action 
of placing something before one’s mental 
vision” (OED), the important link between 
these two perversions becomes clear. Lacan 
further draws out this connection between 
‘giving-to-see-it’ and masochism in Seminar 
X: Anxiety where he notes the distinction 
between voyeurism/exhibitionists and the 
act of what he refers to as “letting something 
be seen” (Lacan, 2016, p. 191) in masochism. 
This means more than the specular image 
being revealed in a process of ‘giving-to-see-it’ 
because it reveals something about the subject 
that is normally concealed. Most interestingly, 
Lacan believes that this revelation of “letting 
something be seen” is anxiety-provoking for 
both men and women, but for woman the 
masquerade of femininity is uncovered to 
show “what there is” (Lacan, 2016, p. 191) and 
for man this revelation of desire only allows 
“what there is not” (Lacan, 2016, p. 191) to be 
uncovered, and we can understand this to be 
his own anxiety.
Where are the Women?
Turning from Freud and Lacan to 
Deleuze it becomes obvious that in most 
discussions on masochism the women  
have been relegated to a lesser position or  
altogether forgotten. However, in Deleuze’s 
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Coldness and Cruelty (1967) he pays particular 
attention to the role of women in the writing 
of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch; Deleuze 
analyses the different fantasy women that ap-
pear in Masoch’s works, but this still remains 
problematic for my discussion because the 
woman is always described in relation to man’s 
desire. These three women exist in a masoch-
istic relationship with the men, but as female 
tops they are not the masochistic directors, 
nor are they sadists able to derive pleasure 
from the situation, because the male bottoms 
disregard woman’s pleasure. However, Deleuze 
classifies the women as masochistic based on 
them existing as “a pure element of masoch-
ism” (Deleuze, 1967, p. 42), and clarifies that 
“it is a mistake to think that she is sadistic  
or even pretending to be so” (Deleuze, 1967,  
p. 42). Two extreme versions of woman are 
identified as the Grecian woman and the 
sadistic woman. The first type, the Grecian 
woman, is the hetaera or Aphrodite, and “is 
dedicated to love and beauty; she lives for 
the moment” (Deleuze, 1967, p. 47). Deleuze 
goes on to describe her as believing “in the 
independence of women and in the fleeting 
nature of love; for her the sexes are equal” 
(1967, p. 47). Aphrodite is the “female princi-
pal” (Deleuze, 1967, p. 47) and the moment  
of equality is the moment in which women 
gain dominance over man because “man 
trembles as soon as woman becomes his equal” 
 (Deleuze, 1967, p. 48). This version of woman 
wants to cause chaos and destroy patriarchal 
systems of control, including marriage, moral-
ity, the Church and the State because they are 
“inventions of man” (Deleuze, 1967, p.48). The 
opposite extreme version of woman in Mas-
och’s writing is the sadistic woman. As a sadist 
“She enjoys hurting and torturing others, but 
it is significant that her actions are prompted 
by a man or otherwise performed in concert 
with a man, whose victim she is always liable 
to become” (Deleuze, 1967, p. 48). Deleuze 
proposes that these two versions of woman 
are not the ideal type for Masoch because “At 
one extreme masochism has yet to come into 
operation, and at the other it has already lost 
its raison d’être” (1967, p. 50). The true fantasy 
woman instead falls somewhere in the middle 
of these extremes, but is almost impossible 
to pinpoint. This fantasy woman does not 
actually exist anywhere within Masoch’s 
writings, and Deleuze can only describe her 
by piecing together various descriptions from 
Masoch’s work; she is “cold—maternal—se-
vere, icy—sentimental—cruel” (1967, p. 51). 
This coldness applies not only to the woman 
in the masochistic relationship, but also the 
sadistic heroes found in sadomasochistic 
literature. For Sade’s characters this is expressed 
as apathy which is directed against all feelings. 
Masoch differs here from Sade in that the 
coldness connected with the fantasy woman 
is not a “negation of feeling, but rather the 
disavowal of sensuality” (Deleuze, 1967, p. 52). 
For Masoch, this cruel and sentimental 
woman is able to “compel man to thought 
and properly constitute the masochistic ideal” 
(Deleuze, 1967, p. 54). However, as I pointed 
out earlier, this cold-hearted woman is not 
the woman I seek; she does not enjoy her own 
subjection and humiliation, and she instead 
serves as the woman-as-fantasy who exists only 
to torture the masochistic man.
The true Masochian woman is only 
implied near the end of Masoch’s literary 
case study of masochism, Venus in Furs; here, 
Wanda ends her relationship with Severin 
in order to have a master of her own. When 
she ends her relationship with Severin she 
says, “Not another slave, I have had enough of 
them: a master. Women need to have a master 
to worship” (Masoch, 1967, p. 258). Although 
few details are provided about Wanda’s new 
relationship with the Greek, the moral of 
the tale is provided by Severin when he says, 
“I was a fool…If only I had whipped her 
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instead!” (Masoch, 1967, p. 271). However, 
this would mean that instead of Severin 
transforming into ‘the hammer’ he would have 
to take on the fantasy role that the masochistic 
woman plays in the work of Masoch. For if he 
became the sadistic torturer in order to whip 
Wanda their relationship would have been 
incompatible.
In Angela Carter’s The Sadeian Woman 
and the Ideology of Pornography (1979) she 
examines the work of Sade as another literary 
case study, and specifically focuses on the two 
sisters Juliette and Justine. In Juliette she finds 
the true Sadeian woman, who is also very 
similar to the extreme sadistic woman that 
Deleuze finds in the work of Masoch. Juliette’s 
ability to become a Sadeian woman is based 
on two things: her ability to be the “perfect 
whore” (Carter, 1979, p. 92) and her rejection 
of femininity. Juliette is motivated by financial 
profit and libidinal gratification, and these 
two things work together to ensure that she 
does not have to submit to any law. Through 
the use of her sexuality as power, “Juliette 
transforms herself from pawn to queen in a 
single move and henceforward goes wherever 
she pleases on the chess board. Nevertheless, 
there remains the question of the presence of 
the king, who remains the lord of the game.” 
(Carter, 1979, p. 91). Juliette lives in a patri-
archal world which is “governed by god, the 
king and the law” (Carter, 1979, p. 92), which 
Carter describes as “the trifold masculine 
symbols of authority” (1979, p. 92). Juliette 
is aware of how to survive in this world, and 
does so through her rational sexuality, but, like 
the Oedipal mother Deleuze describes, she is 
always at risk of becoming the victim, even as 
she engages in sadistic torture.
In Rebecca Comay’s “Adorno avec 
Sade…” she discusses the proximity between 
Adorno and Horkheimer and Lacan’s work  
on Sade. She points out that, for Adorno, 
there exists:
nothing fascinating, nothing shocking, 
nothing disgusting, nothing virulent…
but merely the tedious administration 
of routine piled upon routine, bleached 
out, neutralize, antiseptic: sodomy, 
incest, mutilation, torture, coprophagy, 
whatever, everything reduced to busi-
ness as usual, Juliette as gym coach, the 
bedroom as boardroom, boardroom as 
boredom, boredom as the congealment 
of the always-the-same. (Comay, 2006, p. 8)
This corresponds to the rituals of the liber-
tines, which Carter compares to the Catholic 
Church, and which Juliette is educated in to 
become the Sadeian woman. The banality 
which Comay associates with Sade’s smut also 
applies to Juliette’s libertine education, which 
is learned by rote, much the way schoolchil-
dren endure learning multiplication tables. 
For Juliette to become a perfect whore, and 
eventually place herself “firmly in the camp of 
the masters” (Carter, 1979, p. 98), requires the 
ability to master the education she receives 
from several older women figures. Carter traces 
this education from the convent, where she 
learns from the abbess Delbène “the elements 
of sexual expertise, the relativity of ethics, 
militant feminism and doctrinaire atheism” 
(Carter, 1979, p. 93), to the brothel, where she 
learns to steal, lie, and play a part in a male 
fantasy. In the brothel her “virginity is sold 
successively to fifty buyers” (Carter, 1979, p. 96) 
and her apprenticeship is completed when she 
sells her anus to an archbishop. Much like the 
rote recitation of numbers, Juliette’s virginity 
must be repeatedly sold in this banal way for 
her to master her role as whore.
The ability of Juliette to learn these 
various sexual acts is an example of Freud’s 
theory of polymorphous perversity which 
he outlines in Three Essays. His example of 
the polymorphously perverse subject is the 
‘uncultivated woman’ who learns to be poly-
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morphous through the repetition of different 
sex acts with various partners. Freud provides 
this description of the woman:
Under ordinary conditions she may 
remain normal sexually, but if she is 
led on by a clever seducer she will find 
every sort of perversion to her taste, 
and will retain them as part of her own 
sexual activities. Prostitutes exploit the 
same polymorphous, that is, infantile, 
disposition for the purposes of their 
profession…it becomes impossible not 
to recognize that this same disposition 
to perversions of every kind is a general 
and fundamental human characteristic. 
(1924, p. 57)
In this description of the process for 
developing the polymorphously perverse 
prostitute it is easy to locate Juliette’s own 
education. She, however, does not stop at 
becoming polymorphously perverse in order 
to satisfy her customers, but instead seeks to 
become “a Nietzschean superwoman, which 
is to say, a woman who has transcended her 
gender but not the contradictions inherent 
in it” (Carter, 1979, p. 98). The contradiction 
inherent in being a Sadeian women is just as 
important for the Masochian woman; woman 
is regarded as the ‘weaker sex,’ and so even 
as a sadistic master, Juliette is always at risk 
of becoming the victim of the libertine men. 
For the Masochian woman, the same belief 
that woman is weaker, and that masochism 
itself has something feminine inherent to it, 
means that a woman who enjoys being the 
masochistic bottom is regarded as enjoying 
her own patriarchal oppression. In theorizing 
this woman though, it becomes clear that she 
wields as much power as the Sadeian woman, 
and like Juliette, learns to play a part in her 
own masochistic fantasy by “[playing] with 
mimesis” (Irigaray, 1985, p. 76). Therefore,  
as Juliette adopts the libertine theatre of 
cruelty, where she is willing to play any part, 
and her moral purity, and that of mankind,  
are found in her own infinitely polymorphously 
perverse nature, the Masochian woman adopts 
her own masochistic theatre, where she dictates 
the roles to be played for herself and those who 
enter her theatre.
In their discussion of sadism and mas-
ochism both Deleuze and Lacan destroy the 
illusion of a dichotomy between the two per-
versions. Deleuze states that “The concurrence 
of sadism and masochism is fundamentally 
one of analogy only; their processes and their 
formations are entirely different; their common 
organ, their ‘eye,’ squints and should therefore 
make us suspicious” (Deleuze, 1967, p. 46). 
As I have already discussed, Deleuze sees all 
the women in Masoch’s works as masochistic 
in nature, because each woman “incarnates 
instead the element of ‘inflicting pain’ in  
an exclusively masochistic situation” (1967,  
p. 42), and therefore the men have no need,  
or desire, for the sadistic subject to enter into a 
relationship with them. This understanding is 
reiterated in Žižek’s article “Are We Allowed 
To Enjoy Daphnée du Maurier?” where he 
emphasizes that sadism involves domination, 
and masochism involves liberation. The 
incompatibility of these two perversions is 
made clear through Žižek’s recounting of 
Deleuze’s interpretation of Masoch: “far from 
bringing any satisfaction to the sadistic witness, 
the masochist’s self-torture frustrates the sadist, 




While Deleuze presents the idea that the 
sadist and the masochist are enacting differ-
ent and separate dramas which involve them 
in completely different interactions of the 
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pleasure-pain complex (1967, p. 45), and are 
therefore incompatible as a pair of subjects, 
Lacan’s discussion of the subject provides 
detailed differences which illustrate how and 
why sadism and masochism are incompatible. 
In Anxiety Lacan outlines the fact that these 
two perversions are “not a reversible couple” 
(2017, p. 177); He details the difference 
between them, stating:
We find ourselves, betwixt sadism and 
masochism, in the presence of what 
presents itself as an alienation. That 
which, at the second level, is veiled 
and concealed in each of these two 
subjects appears in the other party at 
the level of what is targeted. There is an 
occultation of anxiety in the first case, 
of the object a in the other. This is not, 
however, a process in reverse, a switch-
around. (Lacan, 2017, p. 177)
It is the differing aims of sadism and 
masochism which make the subject as sadist 
and the subject as masochist completely 
incompatible. The sadist seeks objet a in his 
victim and, as Žižek makes clear, when he 
does not receive what he seeks from the 
masochist he is unsatisfied. The sadist wants 
to invoke shame in the victim through 
the gaze, but in masochism “the victim no 
longer experiences shame, it openly displays 
its jouissance” (Žižek, 2016, p.488). The 
masochist, on the other hand, is thought to 
seek the Other’s jouissance, but what this 
mistaken belief conceals is the true aim of the 
masochist: the Other’s anxiety. Thus, even if 
the same exercise is performed in sadism and 
masochism, the desire of these two figures is 
completely different.
The first point which I will bring up is 
the question of the value of masochism. Lacan 
answers this by saying, “When desire and the 
law find themselves together again, what the 
masochist means to show—and I’ll add, on 
his little stage, because this dimension should 
never be lost sight of—is that the desire of 
the Other lays down the law.” (Lacan, 2017, 
p. 106). This statement echoes several of the 
concepts already covered in this paper—the 
dimension of looking and the importance of 
the desire of the Other—and these concepts 
will also prove to be crucially important for the 
Masochian woman. Lacan goes on to discusses 
masochism and he establishes that the aim of 
the masochist is the Other’s anxiety, which has 
been established as a different aim from the 
sadist, who seeks the object a in the other.
In principle, the concept of women’s 
masochism “is a male fantasy,” or the fantasy 
of the big Other, and which Lacan goes on 
to explain, “In this fantasy, it is by proxy and 
in relation to the masochistic structure that 
is imagined in woman that man sustains his 
jouissance through something that is his 
own anxiety. That is what the object covers 
over. In men, the object is the condition of 
desire.” (Lacan, 2017, p. 190). In contrast, 
“For women, the desire of the Other is the 
means by which her jouissance will have an 
object that is, as it were, suitable.” (Lacan, 
2017, p. 191). Thus, for masochism to exist 
in women, even if it is ironic, Lacan believes 
that the fantasy imagined by the Other, or 
the male fantasy, is what is enacted. This leads 
to the question of what role anxiety plays in 
the male fantasy. As I have already stated, 
Lacan believes the masochist’s aim is the 
anxiety of the Other. If woman is enacting 
a male fantasy, which causes anxiety in the 
face of the Other’s desire, and man sustains 
his jouissance through his own anxiety, what 
is this anxiety? I believe Deleuze provides 
the answer to this question in his own case 
study of the three women figures in Masoch’s 
work. It is the figure of the Grecian woman, 
who “believes in the independence of women 
and in the fleeting nature of love; for her the 
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sexes are equal” (Deleuze 47), that is the cause 
of anxiety for man. For Aphrodite equality 
between men and women is the “crucial 
moment at which she gains dominance over 
man, for ‘man trembles as soon as woman 
becomes his equal’” (47-48).
This raises the problem of how man can 
reject the equality or dominance of woman 
by enacting a masochistic fantasy. For the 
male masochist, he “stages his own servitude” 
(Žižek, 1994, p. 92), and in doing so the man 
is the one “who actually pulls the strings and 
dictates the activity of the woman [domina-
trix]” (Žižek, 1994, p.92). Thus, the man is 
always the one in control, and the constant 
disavowal of real violence allows him to 
confront the anxiety brought on by the Other 
by acting it out in the masochistic theatre. 
In Žižek’s The Metastases of Enjoyment: On 
Women and Causality (1994) he compares 
masochism with the concept of courtly love; 
he cites Deleuze’s discussion of masochism 
to prove the important point that sadism 
and masochism follow opposite modes of 
negation (violent domination vs disavowal 
and controlled violence). In addition to these 
opposite modes of negation, sadism and mas-
ochism also have structural differences in how 
they are enacted by the analysand: institution 
and contract. As Žižek shows, sadism uses the 
“institutional power” to torment “its victim 
and taking pleasure in the victim’s helpless 
resistance” (91). This, however, is exactly what 
the male masochist does not want, for, if he 
is tortured by a sadist, he will be horrified at 
being “reduced in the eyes of the Other to 
objet a” (Žižek, 1994, p. 93). Žižek proposes 
that in this case the masochist responds with 
“irrational violence aimed at the other” (Žižek, 
1994, p. 93). This hystericization is precisely 
what happens to the masochist Severin in 
Venus in Furs. When the Greek whips him, 
rather than Wanda, he is horrified at being 
reduced to objet a and feels he is “dying of 
shame and despair” (Masoch, 1991, p. 268). 
In reaction it is only natural that he responds 
with irrational violence when he becomes 
‘the hammer’. Contrary to this institutional 
violence of sadism, masochism is “made to the 
measure of the victim: it is the victim…who 
initiates a contract with the Master (woman), 
authorizing her to humiliate him in any way 
she considers appropriate” (Žižek, 1994, p. 91). 
The keys to masochism are that the masochist 
enacts the power of the contract, so he is 
the one who is really in control, and that the 
threat of actual violence is always interrupted. 
Real violence is suspended and the entire 
masochistic theatre, as its name suggests,  
is an act or feigning of violence.
From Subordination to 
Affirmation
How does the masochistic theatre then 
allow woman to face her own anxiety, which, 
as Lacan puts it, “is only anxiety faced with 
the desire of the Other” (Lacan, 2017, p. 191)? 
If women’s masochism is theoretically a male 
fantasy, consisting of the man dominating 
the woman, by enacting it in the masochistic 
theatre the woman is traversing the fantasy, 
and confronting the anxiety of the Other at 
the same time. As established, masochism is 
enacted and the rules set out contractually 
by the ‘victim’. For woman, this means she is 
able to escape the institutional and sadistic 
violence, which permeates society, and instead 
can enact the “endless repeating of an inter-
rupted gesture” (Žižek, 1994, pp. 92). The full 
meaning of women’s masochism becomes 
clear in Žižek’s “Are We Allowed to Enjoy 
Daphnée du Maurier?” when he proposes a 
possible subversion of the fantasy of woman 
by woman:
femininity is from the very beginning 
split between Eve and Lilith, between 
40
JENNIFER KOMOROWSKI
‘ordinary’ hysterical feminine subject 
and the fantasmatic spectre of Woman: 
when a man is having sex with a ‘real’ 
woman, he is using her as a masturba-
tory prop to support his fantasizing 
about the non-existent Woman…  
And in Rebecca, her most famous 
novel, du Maurier adds another twist  
to the Lilith myth: the fantasy of Woman 
is (re)appropriated by a woman—what 
if Lilith is not so much a male fantasy as 
the fantasy of a woman, the model of her 
fantasmatic competitor? (Žižek, 2004, n.p.)
Thus, the role playing that takes place in 
the masochistic theatre allows woman to 
reappropriate the fantasy of a woman for her 
own masochistic desire. The multifaceted 
identity of woman Eve/Lilith follows the 
Lacanian definition of the woman who ‘does 
not exist,’ and she cannot be defined by one 
single identity because she has always already 
escaped signification.
This method of appropriation can be 
compared to Irigaray’s feminist praxis of 
mimicry and “[assuming] the feminine role 
deliberately” (Irigaray, 1974, p. 76). In sado-
masochism if the masochist is, to return to 
Freud, the one who is placed “in a characteris- 
tically female situation” (Freud, 1924, p. 277), 
then by assuming the role of the feminine 
masochist for a woman is to reappropriate the 
role of the feminine, and therefore “convert a 
form of subordination into an affirmation, and 
thus to begin to thwart it” (Irigaray, 1974, p. 76). 
Žižek sets the groundwork for how this can 
be accomplished through his explanation of 
masochism through the libidinal economy of 
courtly love. The courtly Lady is described as 
a “cold, distanced, inhuman partner” (Žižek, 
1994, p. 89), much like Masoch’s masochistic 
women, and she assumes the role of the 
master in the relationship by imposing on 
the knight all sorts of “senseless, outrageous, 
impossible, arbitrary, capricious ordeals” (Žižek, 
1994, p. 90). However, as an object of men’s 
desire, the courtly Lady provides a fantasy- 
structure through which woman “refers to 
herself with regard to her (potential) relation-
ship to man” (Žižek, 1994, p. 108). The reaction 
of (some forms of ) feminism to this structure 
is one of panic because it cannot accept any 
form of ‘patriarchal domination’ and this 
becomes a problem because it undermines 
“the fantasy-support of their own feminine 
identity” (Žižek, 1994, p. 108). It is only in 
the perverse (masochistic) contract, which is 
established between equal subjects, that Žižek 
shows us paradoxically “serves to establish a 
relationship of domination” (1994, p. 109) via 
the balanced contract. Žižek’s interpretation of 
masochism through courtly love reveals that 
in the masochistic relationship woman always 
holds some form of power over the man. 
When the woman is playing the dominatrix 
she assumes the traditional role of the Lady 
and makes ridiculous demands of the man 
as knight. Conversely, when she plays the 
subordinate role, what I have been referring to 
as the Masochian woman, she still plays the 
role of the Lady because she sets the terms of 
the contract and still makes demands of the 
man. When woman takes on this subservient 
role, according to Lacan, she is enacting the 
masquerade, a reference to Joan Riviere’s 
“Womanliness as Masquerade” (1929), in 
which she puts on the act of being feminine  
in a defensive mode.
To take this defensive mode of the 
masquerade one step further is to attempt to 
use the act of femininity in order to “[jam] the 
theoretical machinery itself, of suspending its 
pretension to the production of a truth and 
of a meaning that are excessively univocal” 
(Irigaray, 1974, p. 78). Following Lacan’s 
assertion that in masochism “the desire of 
the Other lays down the law” (Lacan, 2017, 
p. 106), the act of intentionally taking on a 
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masochistic position for woman to achieve 
pleasure is a conscious act which “can be found 
only at the price of crossing back through the 
mirror that subtends all speculation. For this 
pleasure is not simply situated in a process of 
reflection or mimesis, nor on one side of this 
process or the other” (Irigaray, 1974, p. 77).  
The law, or language, has traditionally been 
denied to women through their “social inferi-
ority” (Irigaray, 1974, p. 85), but through the 
process of assuming the role of the subordinate 
in the masochistic situation, woman is able to 
define the terms of the contract and rewrite the 
law, and language, in her favour. For Irigaray, 
this type of “language work” takes on the func-
tion of casting phallocentrism “loose from its 
moorings in order to return the masculine to 
its own language, leaving open the possibility 
of a different language” (1974, p. 80). Thus, the 
masochistic contract, which is made possible 
by the equality of the subjects, fulfills the fear 
of woman’s dominance over man; it is written 
in the language of the Masochian woman and 
has the ability to subvert the phallocentric 
language that dominates the rest of the world.
One of the key theoretical points for 
coming to understand the Masochian women 
is that of sexual difference. Following Lacan’s 
starting point ‘The Woman does not exist,’ be-
cause there is no universal meaning to what it 
is to be a woman, for a woman to understand 
who she is a mimetic process occurs which 
she learns from those around her. In Darian 
Leader’s Why do Women Write More Letters 
Than They Post? (1996), he presents several 
hypothetical situations in which women place 
themselves in the role of a man in order to 
understand the way in which men relate to 
other subjects, and particularly women, in the 
case of heterosexual desire. Notably, Leader 
says that women construct love triangles 
because “a triangle is a necessary condition for 
the study of someone else’s desire” (Leader, 
1996, p. 5). This type of triangulation can be 
tied directly back to the masochistic theatre 
and the audience which is implied to be view-
ing the masochistic action take place. Thus, 
the gaze, and the mimetic response which 
follows, is a crucial part of sexual difference for 
woman. Another factor which must be taken 
into consideration when discussing sexual 
difference is feminine jouissance. Grounded  
in the fact that woman is not whole, woman  
has what Lacan calls “a supplementary jouis-
sance compared to what the phallic function 
designates by way of jouissance” (Lacan, 1999, 
p. 73). This feminine jouissance is described 
by Lacan as being what “one experiences and 
yet knows nothing about” (1999, p. 77). One 
of the primary examples Lacan gives to show 
that this extra (en plus) jouissance exists, but 
cannot be put into language, is the statue 
“The Ecstasy of St. Teresa” (1999, p. 76). The 
challenge to describe feminine jouissance 
put forth by Lacan is answered by Irigaray in 
Speculum of the Other Woman (1974). Here she 
takes the same figure of a woman, Saint Teresa 
of Avila, and instead of silencing her by only 
considering her as a statue, she looks to her 
writings to find the description of this extra 
jouissance. Irigaray makes direct reference to 
Saint Teresa when she writes, “How strange is 
the economy of this specula(riza)tion of woman, 
who in her mirror seems ever to refer back to 
a transcendence. Who moves away (for) who 
comes near, who groans to be separated from 
the one who holds her closest in his embrace” 
(Irigaray, 1974, p. 201). The footnote, quoting 
from Saint Teresa’s vision of the Flaming 
Heart, refers to pain which “was so great that  
it made me moan, and yet so surpassing was 
the sweetness of this excessive pain that I 
could not wish to be rid of it” (Irigaray, 1974, 
p. 201). This experience of feminine jouissance, 
which in statue form Lacan insists that it 
cannot be denied Saint Teresa is ‘coming,’ 
is a description of an experience which is 
undeniably masochistic. Irigaray’s interpreta-
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tion of this vision is that it is an experience of 
transcendence, unmistakably masochistic, and 
is a part of the specularization of woman.  
This connection back to the mimetic function 
of the mirror stage and the gaze is described by 
Irigaray as “the work of death” (1974, p. 54).
In thinking through the ironic masochism 
of women, it becomes clear that, in materialist 
terms, it is a contradictory concept, and it is  
in contradictions where the truth is found.2  
Thus, by theorizing the seemingly ironic 
Masochian Woman, it becomes clear that 
within the masochistic contract submission 
requires equality between men and women  
to come first. Therefore, it becomes apparent 
that thinking through each contradiction, 
in turn, leads us to another contradiction. 
Following this logic, when women enact 
masochism, its success depends on equality 
between man and woman, but the outcome is 
the dominance of the masochistic woman.
2 From Hegel’s thesis “Contradictio ist regula veri, non-contradictio falsi,” or “Contradiction is the rule of the 
true, non-contradiction of the false” (Dolar, 2017, p. 87).
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